It’s All About (Re)location: Interpreting the
Federal Sentencing Enhancement for
Relocating a Fraudulent Scheme
Stephen Ferro†
Section 2B1.1(b)(10) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual increases the
recommended sentencing ranges for defendants who make fraudulent schemes
harder to uncover. In particular, subsection (A) of this Guideline—the relocation enhancement—increases a defendant’s recommended sentence if she “relocated, or participated in relocating, a fraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement or regulatory officials.” This provision raises the question: Where is a
fraudulent scheme located? The question might have a straightforward answer in
cases that involve few defendants and few fraudulent acts. But federal circuit courts
have split over how to apply this enhancement to schemes that span multiple jurisdictions at once, exacerbating a preexisting disagreement about the level of intent
required by the relocation enhancement.
This Comment argues that courts can resolve these problems by limiting the
applicability of the relocation enhancement. Specifically, courts should apply the relocation enhancement only to cases where the defendant committed an act of deception in one jurisdiction, grew suspicious of a specific law enforcement investigation
into her actions, fled the jurisdiction because of that investigation, and then committed the same deceptive act in a new jurisdiction. This reading draws support
from interpretive canons, Sentencing Commission guidance, and existing literature
on the deterrent effect of sentencing enhancements. This reading also encourages
courts to make greater use of another provision in § 2B1.1(b)(10)—the sophisticatedmeans enhancement—to address the problems posed by multijurisdictional fraud
schemes.
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INTRODUCTION
Nobody likes telemarketers, least of all when they perpetrate
fraud. The specter of scam calls loomed large during the nineties,
when many feared that advancing technology could dramatically
increase the scope and effectiveness of telemarketing fraud.1 To
address these concerns, Congress passed the Telemarketing
Fraud Prevention Act of 19982 (TFPA). This law increased the
penalties associated with a telemarketing fraud conviction in various ways. In particular, one provision instructed the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Commission) to provide a sentencing enhancement for crimes that “involved sophisticated means,
including but not limited to sophisticated concealment efforts,
such as perpetrating the offense from outside the United States.”3
In response, the Commission promulgated the Guideline
found at § 2B1.1(b)(10) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(Guidelines).4 Section 2B1.1(b)(10)—which applies to both

1
See Bruce Horovitz, Telemarketing Scams Expected to Get Slicker: Fraud: A Consumer Coalition Warns That the Use of New Technologies by Con Artists Will Cost Victims
More Than $10 Billion a Year in the 1990s, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1990),
https://perma.cc/KFV9-DDJ8.
2
Pub L. No. 105-184, 112 Stat. 520 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
3
Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act § 6(c)(2), 112 Stat. at 521.
4
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(10) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). Note
that, while the Guideline in question has been codified under various sections in previous
years, the language has remained largely the same since its enactment. This Comment
refers to the current location of these enhancements throughout.
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telemarketing scams and many other types of fraud schemes5—
punishes a defendant for taking steps to keep her scheme from
being detected by increasing her offense level. 6 This increased
offense level, in turn, leads to a higher recommended sentence
under the Guidelines.7 Though the Guidelines have been advisory
since 2005,8 they continue to play an important role in federal
sentencing, and judges continue to impose many sentences within
the ranges recommended by the Guidelines.9
More specifically, subsection (B) of the Guideline—the “international enhancement”—increases a defendant’s offense level if “a
substantial part of [her] fraudulent scheme was committed from
outside the United States.”10 Subsection (C)—the “sophisticatedmeans enhancement”—provides for the same increase if she “intentionally engaged in or caused [ ] conduct constituting sophisticated means” in connection with a fraudulent scheme.11 But, in
addition to these enhancements, the Commission provided for a
third sentencing enhancement not expressly called for by the
TFPA. Subsection (A) of § 2B1.1(b)(10)—the “relocation enhancement”—increases a defendant’s offense level if she “relocated, or
participated in relocating, a fraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement or regulatory officials.”12
This relocation enhancement is easy enough to apply in some
simple cases. Consider, for example, a person who sells fake Rolex
watches. This scheme involves a single person, and each fraudulent act involves a single transaction, so there is no question about
the location of the scheme; it takes place where the person makes
her sales. Now, say that this person starts her enterprise in New
York, but, after hearing that the police are looking into her sales,
she moves to California and takes up the scheme anew. Because
she moved across jurisdictional lines to evade law enforcement,
and because she took up her scheme in the new jurisdiction, the
enhancement would certainly apply to her case.

5
See United States v. Singh, 291 F.3d 756, 761 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing U.S. SENT’G
GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 577 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2003)) (noting that the section is not “reserved solely to punish telemarketing fraud”).
6
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(10) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
7
See infra Appendix.
8
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005) (opinion of Breyer, J.).
9
See infra text accompanying notes 50–58.
10 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
11 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
12 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(10)(A) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
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But, as one might guess, schemes are seldom this simple.
Fraudsters could commit different parts of the scheme in different
jurisdictions—for example, by making fake watches in one state
and selling them in another state.13 Though these schemes involve
crossjurisdictional trips, those trips might not fit the definition of
relocations—they could just as easily be characterized as expansions of the scheme.14 These types of issues prompt the following
question: When do these multijurisdictional schemes fall within
the meaning of the relocation enhancement? That is, how can
courts apply the relocation enhancement to a scheme which, by
its very nature, operates in multiple jurisdictions at once?
This question has become the subject of a wide-ranging circuit split, with five circuits advancing three different proposals.
The first of these is the “home-base approach,” initially articulated in an unpublished Eleventh Circuit opinion and later developed by the Seventh Circuit. This approach states that a defendant relocates a scheme only if she moves the “home base” of that
scheme to a different federal district.15 The second proposal is the
“key-acts approach,” advanced by the First Circuit. This approach
locates the scheme where the defendants commit acts that constitute “the heart of the [fraudulent] enterprise.”16 If the defendants
commit these acts in multiple jurisdictions, they relocate the
scheme. Finally, the Third and Sixth Circuits have put forward
the “nature-of-scheme approach.” Under this approach, courts focus less on identifying a scheme’s location and determining
whether that location has changed. Instead, the nature-of-scheme
approach looks to how the scheme itself is organized, allowing
courts to apply the enhancement based on specified characteristics of the scheme planned.17 For example, the Third Circuit allows courts to “conside[r] the geographic scope of the conspiracy”

13 Note that a “jurisdiction,” as used in § 2B1.1(b)(10), refers to the geographic area
covered by a federal district. Hence, a defendant will always relocate to a new jurisdiction
when she crosses state lines, but she can relocate to another jurisdiction without leaving
a state if it has multiple federal districts. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 153 F. App’x
556, 558 (2005) (per curiam) (discussing instances in which the defendant left the Northern
District of Georgia and traveled to other federal districts, both inside and outside of
Georgia).
14 See, e.g., Morris, 153 F. App’x at 558.
15 United States v. Hines-Flagg, 789 F.3d 751, 754–56 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Morris, 153 F. App’x at 558–59.
16 United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 15–16 (1st Cir. 2012).
17 See United States v. Thung Van Huynh, 884 F.3d 160, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2018);
United States v. Woodson, 960 F.3d 852, 854–55 (6th Cir. 2020).
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when deciding whether the defendant relocated the scheme, focusing on the distance between the areas of fraudulent activity.18
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit looks to the setup of the scheme itself,
explaining that “‘where travel to other jurisdictions’ to avoid detection by law enforcement is ‘a key component of a fraud scheme,’
the [relocation] enhancement applies.”19
These circuits also disagree about how to interpret the phrase
“to evade law enforcement,”20 though they give this issue less attention. More specifically, the courts are split over whether the
relocation enhancement requires general intent (a desire to keep
the scheme from attracting notice) or specific intent (a desire to
circumvent a particular law enforcement investigation). The
Seventh Circuit has reasoned in dicta that “application of this [relocation] enhancement requires more than just the operation of a
multijurisdictional scheme in order to reduce the chances of detection,” favoring a specific-intent reading.21 But the First Circuit
disputes this idea, finding instead that courts can infer an intent
to evade law enforcement from the defendant’s methods of operation or choice of targets.22 The Third and Sixth Circuits have advanced similar interpretations in unpublished opinions,23 and—
as demonstrated below—the nature-of-scheme approach they employ requires them to adopt a general-intent reading of the relocation enhancement.24
This Comment sheds new light on these circuit splits by
drawing on the canon of statutory surplusage—the rule of interpretation that states that “every word and every provision in a
legal instrument is to be given effect.”25 This canon, in connection
with the Commission’s amendment notes on the enhancement
and existing literature on criminal deterrence, helps the Comment
develop two key insights on how courts should interpret the relocation enhancement.

18

Thung Van Huynh, 884 F.3d at 168.
Woodson, 960 F.3d at 855 (quoting United States v. Thornton, 718 F. App’x 399,
403–04 (6th Cir. 2018)).
20 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(10)(A) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
21 Hines-Flagg, 789 F.3d at 756.
22 See Savarese, 686 F.3d at 16 n.12.
23 See United States v. Braxton, 374 F. App’x 248, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing
United States v. Vega-Iturrino, 565 F.3d 430, 433 (8th Cir. 2009)); United States v. Hessa,
464 F. App’x 473, 475 (6th Cir. 2012).
24 See infra notes 143–45145 and accompanying text.
25 Surplusage Canon, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
19
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First, my analysis shows that the phrase “to evade law enforcement” requires something more than a general intent to
evade law enforcement; in fact, the Commission’s amendment
notes suggest that the relocation enhancement should only apply
in cases where the defendant “know[s] or suspect[s] that [law] enforcement authorities have discovered the scheme.” 26 Put another way, the enhancement requires a type of specific intent
consisting of two criteria: the defendant must know or suspect
that she is under a law enforcement investigation, and that
knowledge or suspicion must arise from the specific scheme at
issue. Second, my analysis demonstrates that courts can—and
do—use the sophisticated-means enhancement to address the
problem of multijurisdictional fraud schemes. Existing literature
even suggests that the sophisticated-means enhancement is better suited to address this problem than the relocation enhancement. Both of these observations generally weigh in favor of giving the relocation enhancement a narrower construction than it
has received thus far in the courts.
In light of these observations, I offer three concrete proposals
for courts going forward. First, courts should reject the nature-ofscheme approach advanced by the Third and Sixth Circuits, as
that approach contravenes the surplusage canon and the Commission’s amendment notes. Second, courts should use a modified
version of the First Circuit’s key-acts approach to interpret the
relocation enhancement narrowly. Finally, courts should read the
sophisticated-means enhancement broadly and recognize the potential of this enhancement to deter multijurisdictional fraud
schemes.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an
overview of federal sentencing, the Guidelines, and
§ 2B1.1(b)(10). Part II outlines the circuit splits surrounding the
relocation enhancement. Part III analyzes the circuit splits
through the use of interpretive canons, supplemented by Commission commentary and existing literature on criminal deterrence.
Part IV draws on this analysis to form some concrete proposals.
I. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND § 2B1.1(b)(10)
The Guidelines aim to “review and rationalize the federal
sentencing process” by “creat[ing] categories of offense behavior
26

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 577 cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2003).
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and offender characteristics” and “specify[ing] an appropriate sentence for each class of convicted persons.”27 Though the Guidelines
initially required judges to impose sentences within a defendant’s
prescribed sentencing range,28 the Supreme Court held this requirement to be unconstitutional, and the Guidelines have been
merely advisory since 2005.29
Nonetheless, the Guidelines continue to exert a large influence over federal sentencing. Part I.A notes two reasons why this
remains the case. First, courts must correctly calculate a defendant’s Guidelines range before ruling and provide additional reasoning justifying sentences made outside the range,30 giving courts
an incentive to issue a sentence within the recommended range.
Second, the Guidelines exert an “anchoring effect” on sentences
that vary from the recommended ranges, limiting the extent of
those variances.31
Part I.B then describes the enhancements contained in
§ 2B1.1(b)(10) and notes the ambiguity contained in the relocation enhancement. Because courts are required to interpret the
Guidelines correctly, they have a stake in resolving that ambiguity in a clear and correct manner. And, because defendants can
receive a higher sentencing range when the relocation enhancement applies, they have a stake in its correct application.
A. Federal Sentencing and the Guidelines
Congress formed the Commission in 198432 to “establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice

27

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (“[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within
the range, referred to in [the Guidelines].”). Though the statute allowed a court to depart
from the Guidelines upon finding that “there exist[ed] an aggravating or mitigating circumstance . . . not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission,”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), the Guidelines still mandated a specific sentencing outcome in
many cases, given that “[i]n most cases, as a matter of law, the Commission will have
adequately taken all relevant factors into account.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
234 (2005) (opinion of Stevens, J.).
29 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
30 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007) (citing Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 347–48, 351, 356–58 (2007)).
31 See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he guideline ranges exert a gravitational pull on non-guideline sentences, making them closer to
sentences within that range than they would be were there no guidelines.”).
32 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
28

1472

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:6

system.”33 These policies should meet “the purposes of sentencing
as set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)],”34 which instructs courts
to impose sentences that “reflect the seriousness of the offense,”
“afford adequate deterrence,” “protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant,” and “provide the defendant with . . . correctional treatment.”35 The policies should also “provide certainty
and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities . . . while maintaining sufficient
flexibility to permit individualized sentences.”36 The Commission
promulgated—and continues to update—the Guidelines to meet
this mandate.37
The Guidelines operate by mapping individual offenses to a
specific “guideline range” outlined in the Guidelines’ sentencing
table.38 To determine a defendant’s sentencing range, the court
must first consult the Guidelines Manual to determine what
guidelines are applicable to the defendant’s statutory offense.39
These guidelines will provide the judge with a defendant’s “base
offense level”—a number representing the severity of the offense
standing alone.40 In a wire-fraud case, for example, the Guidelines
would direct courts to § 2B1.1,41 which provides a base offense
level of 6.42 Courts should then adjust this offense level “as appropriate” based on the specific facts underlying the crime, including
the victim or victims involved, any obstruction that took place,
and the defendant’s role in the crime.43 In the wire-fraud case
mentioned above, courts would apply § 2B1.1(b) to accomplish
this goal, adjusting the offense level based on the various details

33

28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1).
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A).
35 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
36 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
37 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (“[T]he
guidelines are the product of a deliberative process that seeks to embody the purposes of
sentencing set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act.”).
38 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(a)(7), 5A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018). The sentencing table in § 5A is reproduced infra, Appendix.
39 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(a)(1), 1B1.2(a) (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018).
40 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(1)–(2) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
41 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (connecting
charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1343—the criminal statute punishing wire fraud—to §§ 2B1.1
and 2C1.1, the second of which only covers public officials).
42 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a)(2) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
43 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(3) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
34
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surrounding the defendant’s case.44 Finally, courts should look to
any past offenses committed by the defendant and any applicable
adjustments to determine her “criminal history category.”45 These
two scores—the offense level and the criminal history category—
provide the defendant’s guideline range in months when plugged
into the Commission’s sentencing table.46
Notably, courts do not have to issue a sentence within the
guideline range. The Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. Booker47 made the Guidelines advisory in 2005, allowing courts
to vary from the guideline range to further the goals of sentencing
outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).48 In addition, the Guidelines
themselves provide a list of circumstances in which courts can depart from the sentencing range for good cause.49 Thus, a defendant’s guideline range will not necessarily control the sentence she
receives.
Nonetheless, the Guidelines continue to play a significant
role in federal sentencing for two reasons. First, courts still have
a large incentive to issue a sentence within the guideline range
after Booker. A court must calculate a defendant’s guideline range
correctly during sentencing proceedings, even if it eventually departs or varies from the range.50 Failure to do so could result in
reversal on appeal.51 Moreover, whenever a court deviates from
the guideline range, it must provide an explanation justifying its
choice, with larger variances calling for greater justifications.52
The effort involved in producing these explanations—along with
the possibility of getting overturned on appeal—will often lead
judges to adhere to the advisory Guidelines. Empirical observations bear this out. For example, in fiscal year 2019, a majority of

44 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(providing for increased offense levels based on the monetary loss involved, the number of
victims involved, and other characteristics of the offense).
45 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(6) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
46 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(a)(7), 5A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
47 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
48 Id. at 245–46 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
49 See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0–2.24 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018). Note that “departures” and “variances” are terms of art in federal sentencing. “Departures” are sentence range deviations based on other provisions in the Guidelines
Manual, while “variances” are deviations based on external statutory considerations.
See Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714 (2007).
50 Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 347–48).
51 Id. at 51.
52 Id. at 50.
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sentences fell within their corresponding guideline ranges,53 and
only 23% of cases involved a downward variance under
§ 3553(a).54
Second, even when judges choose to vary from the guideline
range, the range exerts an “anchoring effect” on the sentence imposed.55 An anchoring effect is “the human tendency to adjust
judgments or assessments higher or lower based on previously
disclosed external information—the ‘anchor.’” 56 In sentencing, the
guideline range serves as this anchor, “exert[ing] a gravitational
pull on non-guideline sentences, making them closer to sentences
within that range than they would be were there no guidelines.”57
Again, empirical observations bear this out: the average extent of
sentence reductions has not increased substantially since the
Guidelines became advisory.58
To summarize, federal courts must begin sentencing by correctly applying the Guidelines to a defendant’s case. The Guidelines provide each defendant with an offense level—based on the
statutory crime committed and the specific characteristics of the
offense—and a criminal history category. Those numbers then
produce a recommended sentencing range for the defendant. The
judge has discretion to issue a sentence that falls outside this
range based on additional considerations found in the Guidelines
themselves or the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But, since
courts must calculate the guideline range in every case and have
an incentive to issue a sentence within that range, most sentences
will adhere to the Guidelines’ recommendations.
B. Guideline § 2B1.1(b)(10)
The Commission has executed the TFPA’s directives through
the Sentencing Guidelines located in § 2B1.1, which deals with
53 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 86 (2019).
54 See id. at 101 n.1.
55 See Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824.
56 Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” Biases
in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 495 (2014).
57 Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824; see also Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches
About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 137 (2006),
https://perma.cc/9G8Q-GAAE (“Studies underscore the significance of [an] initial anchor;
judgments tend to be strongly biased in its direction. In effect, the 300-odd page Guideline
Manual provides ready-made anchors.”).
58 Bennett, supra note 56, at 520 & fig. 6.
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fraud, larceny, theft, forgery, and other types of economic offenses.59
This Comment focuses on the provisions contained in
§ 2B1.1(b)(10). Section 2B1.1(b)(10) instructs courts to increase a
defendant’s offense level by 2 if any of the following conditions
apply:
(A) the defendant relocated, or participated in relocating, a
fraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement or regulatory officials; (B) a substantial part of a
fraudulent scheme was committed from outside the United
States; or (C) the offense otherwise involved sophisticated
means and the defendant intentionally engaged in or caused
the conduct constituting sophisticated means.60
The Guideline also states that when the enhancement applies,
the defendant should receive a minimum offense level of 12.61 For
the purposes of clarity and brevity, I refer to subsection (A) of
this Guideline as the “relocation enhancement,” subsection (B)
as the “international enhancement,” and subsection (C) as the
“sophisticated-means enhancement.”
To better contextualize these provisions, three clarifying
points merit mention here. First, § 2B1.1(b)(10) can have an appreciable effect on a defendant’s sentence. While a two-level increase in a defendant’s offense level will have a relatively modest
impact on most sentences, it can increase a defendant’s sentencing range by multiple years for serious offenses.62 Moreover, the
minimum offense level imposed by § 2B1.1(b)(10) places a defendant in Zone C of the sentencing table,63 which precludes her from
receiving a sentence of probation without a departure or variance.64 Thus, the proper application of § 2B1.1(b)(10) can mean a
great deal to a great many defendants.

59 The areas covered by § 2B1.1 are laid out in detail by the Section’s title. U.S.
SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
60 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(10) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
61 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(10) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
62 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018); infra
Appendix; see also Miriam H. Baer, Unsophisticated Sentencing, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 61, 73
(2015) (“For high-loss offenders, as well as recidivists, the enhancement can result in substantially greater terms of imprisonment, with increases of twenty or even thirty
months.”).
63 See infra Appendix.
64 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.1(d) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
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Second, § 2B1.1(b)(10) has grown in importance since the
Commission added it to the Guidelines in 1998.65 The language of
the Guideline suggests—and courts widely accept—that the
Guideline is applicable to all federal fraud offenses, not just the
telemarketing schemes contemplated by the TFPA. 66 In addition,
courts have increasingly applied the Guideline in recent years.
In fiscal year 2002, for example, the Guideline was applied in
160 cases;67 by fiscal year 2019, that number had increased to
1,015 cases.68 Given the ever-growing number of consumer fraud
reports,69 the number of cases could increase further in the coming years.
Finally, while courts increasingly apply the relocation enhancement, there is no definitive guidance regarding what the relocation enhancement requires. Courts widely read the relocation
enhancement as requiring two separate elements before it can be
applied. Specifically, the defendant must have “relocated, or participated in relocating” a fraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction, and she must have taken those actions in order to evade law
enforcement.70 But neither the Guideline nor its application notes
elaborate on what these elements mean. They provide no method
of determining when a defendant has relocated a scheme or if she
has done so to evade law enforcement.71 These questions have
largely been left for the courts to answer.
65 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 577 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2003)
(noting that the amendment became effective November 1, 1998).
66 See, e.g., United States v. Singh, 291 F.3d 756, 761 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing U.S.
SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 577 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2003)).
67 U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N, USE OF GUIDELINES AND SPECIFIC OFFENSE
CHARACTERISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 2002 8, 27 (2002). Note that the three enhancements were
originally codified at § 2F1.1 of the Guidelines Manual, but this section was deleted and
consolidated with § 2B1.1 on November 1, 2001. Id. at 26 n.27. The 160-case figure includes all citations under both § 2B1.1 and § 2F1.1.
68 U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N, USE OF GUIDELINES AND SPECIFIC OFFENSE
CHARACTERISTICS: GUIDELINE CALCULATION BASED, FISCAL YEAR 2019 11 (2019); see also
Baer, supra note 62, at 68–69 (showing that “the percentage of fraud defendants who have
received a sophisticated means enhancement . . . more than tripled” between 2005 and 2013).
69 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK 2020 6
(2021), https://perma.cc/Q3YD-RZYW (showing an increase from 0.33 million consumer
fraud reports in 2001 to 4.72 million in 2020).
70 See United States v. Hines-Flagg, 789 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2015); United States
v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Thung Van Huynh, 884 F.3d
160, 167 (3d Cir. 2018).
71 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(providing commentary on the sophisticated-means enhancement and international enhancement but not the relocation enhancement). This remark should not be taken to mean
that the Commission’s notes on the relocation enhancement cannot elucidate its meaning.
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLITS
In some cases, the application of the relocation enhancement
is fairly straightforward. As an example, consider the case United
States v. Smith.72 In Smith, the defendant opened several credit
accounts under fake or stolen identities and used those accounts
to make fraudulent purchases.73 Smith did this for a few months
in Iowa before he moved with his family to Florida. 74 Once in
Florida, he took up his scheme again, using a fake name to make
$15,000 in fraudulent charges.75 Based on these facts, the trial
court applied the relocation enhancement to Smith’s case, and the
Eighth Circuit upheld its application.76 Smith unquestionably relocated his scheme; he was the only person involved in its operation, and he carried it out in multiple federal jurisdictions.77 Moreover, there was no question that Smith relocated “to evade law
enforcement” since testimony at his sentencing hearing indicated
that he “likely knew . . . that federal law enforcement agents had
an arrest warrant for [him].”78 Thus, Smith presents an easy case
for both elements of the relocation enhancement. The scheme had
a definite, discernable location, and the record provided clear evidence of Smith’s intent to evade law enforcement.
The analysis becomes more complicated, however, when the
scheme is designed to operate in multiple jurisdictions at once.
Imagine that, instead of moving to Florida and continuing the
scheme, Smith regularly stole IDs in Iowa and then flew to Florida
to make fraudulent purchases. While the scheme in this scenario
still operates across jurisdictional lines, it does not appear to have
an easily discernable location—it could be “located” in Iowa, in
Florida, or in both states at once. Moreover, while Smith likely
makes these out-of-state trips to avoid detection, he might not intend “to evade law enforcement” in the sense of avoiding a particular investigation.
On the contrary, this Comment argues that a close reading of these materials can resolve
a significant portion of the circuit split. My remark here only notes that the application
notes and other explanatory materials provide no direct definitions of what it means to
relocate a scheme or evade law enforcement.
72 367 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 534 U.S. 1103 (2005).
73 Id. at 739.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 739–40.
77 In fact, Smith did not even dispute the trial court’s finding that he relocated the
scheme. See Smith, 367 F.3d at 740.
78 Id.
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These problems have produced two circuit splits involving the
First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. Principally,
these circuits disagree over what a defendant must do to relocate
a multijurisdictional scheme within the meaning of
§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(A). The circuits also disagree about whether a general intent to avoid detection will suffice under the relocation enhancement or if specific intent is required. Though the opinions
do not focus on the second issue, this Comment argues that both
issues have important implications for how courts should interpret the relocation enhancement going forward.
A. The Home-Base Approach
Two circuits have advanced what I call the “home-base approach” to address the problem of multijurisdictional schemes. In
essence, this approach states that a multijurisdictional scheme is
located at the conspirators’ base of operations (the area to which
they return after executing the other, discrete parts of the
scheme). Accordingly, in order for a defendant to relocate the
scheme, she must move the home base across jurisdictional lines.
The Eleventh Circuit first advanced this interpretation with
its opinion in United States v. Morris.79 The scheme at issue in
Morris centered on credit card fraud. Morris and his coconspirators
would steal credit cards and driver’s licenses from health clubs in
and around Atlanta, use the cards to fraudulently purchase goods,
and then give the goods to a fence (someone who sells stolen goods)
in Marietta, Georgia.80 Though both Marietta and Atlanta are
located in the Northern District of Georgia, one witness testified
that Morris and others would occasionally travel to cities in the
Middle District of Georgia or to other states to make fraudulent
purchases.81 On this basis, the trial court applied the relocation
enhancement to Morris’s sentence.82
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentence in part. Because
the Guidelines did not define the term “relocate,” the Eleventh
Circuit stated that it must give the word its ordinary meaning: to
“establish or lay out in a new place.” 83 Under this definition, the
out-of-town trips made by Morris did not constitute a relocation
79
80
81
82
83

153 F. App’x 556 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
Id. at 557.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 557–58.
Id. at 558 (citing Relocate, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976)).
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of the scheme since Morris “always returned to the Northern
District of Georgia” and the fence did not change his residence.84
Rather, the temporary excursions were “an expansion, and not a
relocation, of the conspiracy.”85
Though Morris is an unpublished per curiam opinion, its
reasoning proved to be persuasive when the Seventh Circuit considered the multijurisdictional scheme problem. In United States
v. Hines-Flagg,86 the Seventh Circuit analyzed the relocation enhancement against the backdrop of an identity-theft scheme.
Using their home computer in Detroit, Hines-Flagg and her
nephew illegally accessed individual credit reports and made fake
IDs with the fraudulently obtained information.87 They then traveled to neighboring states, opened lines of credit with the fake
IDs, purchased goods, and either kept the goods for personal use
or sold them once back in Detroit.88
The Seventh Circuit held that the relocation enhancement
did not apply to the scheme at issue. “We do not believe that this
Guideline applies to every fraudulent scheme that just happens
to operate in multiple jurisdictions,” the court remarked. 89
“Hines-Flagg’s scheme was always meant to operate in multiple
locations, with Detroit as its home base. . . . Therefore, the
scheme was not ‘relocated’ to Wisconsin, Ohio, and Illinois when
Hines-Flagg traveled to those locations.”90 The court went on to
analogize the case to Morris, noting that “the fraudulently obtained
merchandise was always delivered to, and eventually fenced
from,” a particular city in both cases.91
Having found that the defendants did not relocate a scheme
within the meaning of § 2B1.1(b)(10)(A), the Hines-Flagg court
observed that it “[did] not need to rule on whether any hypothetical relocation was done ‘to evade law enforcement.’” 92 However,
the court went on to note that the facts of the case likely failed
the intent element of the relocation enhancement as well. The
court noted that “most criminal enterprises are set up to avoid

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Morris, 153 F. App’x at 558.
Id.
789 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 793.
Id. at 753–54.
Id. at 755.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Hines-Flagg, 789 F.3d at 755–56.
Id. at 756.
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getting caught.”93 From this proposition, it reasoned that “application of [the relocation] enhancement requires more than just
the operation of a multijurisdictional scheme in order to reduce
the chances of detection.”94
This reading of the relocation enhancement’s intent requirement is the minority view among federal circuits. In support of its
reading, the Hines-Flagg court cites United States v. Paredes,95 a
Tenth Circuit case analyzing the relocation enhancement. In
Paredes, the Tenth Circuit found that the defendant acted with
the requisite intent when he “moved from Utah to Idaho because
Utah became ‘hot’ after one of the [coconspirators] was arrested.”96
But while Paredes established that this type of proof of specific
intent is sufficient to apply the enhancement, it did not decide
whether this type of proof would be necessary to apply the enhancement, as the Seventh Circuit appears to require. Moreover,
many circuits directly disagree with this reading of the intent
requirement.97
B. The Key-Acts Approach
The First Circuit has advanced a different approach to the
multijurisdictional scheme problem. This method—which I call
the “key-acts approach”—locates a fraudulent scheme wherever
its most important actions take place, as opposed to at a particular
fixed base of operations. If the defendant carries out key actions in
multiple jurisdictions, then she relocates a scheme within the
meaning of § 2B1.1(b)(10)(A).
The First Circuit lays out this interpretation in United States
v. Savarese.98 In Savarese, the First Circuit considered a credit
card fraud scheme organized by Savarese and his compatriots in
Boston. Savarese would travel to different gyms across the country to steal credit cards. He would then fax the credit card information to his coconspirators, who would work with a Bostonbased photography studio to create fake IDs matching the stolen
93

Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Paredes, 461 F.3d 1190, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006)).
95 461 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2006).
96 Id. at 1192.
97 See United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 16 n.12 (1st Cir. 2012); United States
v. Braxton, 374 F. App’x 248, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Vega-Iturrino,
565 F.3d 430, 433 (8th Cir. 2009)); United States v. Hessa, 464 F. App’x 473, 475 (6t h
Cir. 2012).
98 686 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
94

2021]

It’s All About (Re)location

1481

credit cards. Finally, some members of the conspiracy would go to
racetracks and casinos in different states and withdraw large
cash advances with the fraudulently obtained information.99
On its face, this fact pattern appears to resemble the one in
Morris. Both schemes involve going to gyms, stealing credit cards,
and then reporting back to a fixed home base. Nonetheless, the
First Circuit declined to extend Morris’s reasoning to the facts of
Savarese. Whereas Atlanta served as a main hub for the scheme
in Morris, in Savarese the defendant’s Boston base was used to
carry out more “tangential elements” of the scheme.100 “The theft
and fraudulent use of the credit cards seems to us at least as critical, if not more so, to the operation’s success than any of its other
elements,” the court reasoned; “indeed, these acts comprised the
heart of the enterprise.”101 Having found that Savarese’s thefts
and withdrawals constituted the main part of the scheme and
that Savarese conducted these thefts in multiple federal jurisdictions, the First Circuit upheld the application of the relocation
enhancement.102
The First and Seventh Circuits have taken some steps to minimize the differences between the home-base and key-acts approaches. Savarese, for example, specifically “reserve[d] judgment” on the reasoning of Morris instead of challenging the case
directly, explaining that the transitory thefts in Morris were less
central to the scheme.103 Hines-Flagg showed a similar reticence
toward challenging Savarese, instead noting that, “[w]ere we to
use Savarese’s approach, Detroit would be ‘the heart of th[is]
enterprise.’”104
But these attempts to reconcile the two approaches are unavailing. First, if courts assume that the central hub of a scheme
has some independent significance, then the home-base approach
must occasionally produce different results than the key-acts approach. Courts could define the scheme’s home base in one of two
ways: it could either be the place to which the defendants regularly return (as in Morris and Hines-Flagg)105 or the place where

99

Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 15.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 15–16.
103 Savarese, 686 F.3d at 15.
104 Hines-Flagg, 789 F.3d at 756 (second alteration in original) (quoting Savarese, 686
F.3d at 15).
105 See Morris, 153 F. App’x at 558; Hines-Flagg, 789 F.3d at 755.
100
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the defendants carry out the most important parts of their scheme
(as in Savarese).106 If courts adopt the former definition, then the
home-base and key-acts approaches will produce different results
in cases where the important parts of the scheme take place outside of a central, fixed location. And, if courts adopt the latter definition, then the home-base approach collapses into the key-acts
approach; courts will simply locate a scheme where the important
actions take place, regardless of whether that place is fixed.
Furthermore, even if we assume that the First, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits are all applying their own versions of the same
test, those versions nevertheless produce substantially different
results in application. For example, in Savarese, the defendant
received the enhancement in part because of his fraudulent credit
card use in multiple states,107 but, in Hines-Flagg, the defendant
avoided the penalty despite taking the same action.108 Put another
way, even if we assume that the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits’
home-base approach could collapse into the key-acts approach,
the circuits would need to agree on what constitutes the key acts
of each fraudulent scheme in order to fully resolve the circuit
split.
Finally, even if the circuits agreed on a method to determine
where a scheme is located, they would still disagree over how to interpret the relocation enhancement’s intent element. In Savarese,
the First Circuit read the phrase “to evade law enforcement” as
requiring a general intent to evade law enforcement. In its view,
the fact that the defendants simply “avoided returning to the
same health clubs and gambling establishments” was sufficient
evidence to infer the requisite intent.109 This reading has been
adopted by the majority of circuits to consider the issue. The
Eighth Circuit has stated that the relocation enhancement does
not require “that the relocation be motivated by a ‘specific’ threat
of arrest as opposed to a more general intent to evade law enforcement,”110 and the Third and Sixth Circuits have reached similar

106 See Savarese, 686 F.3d at 15 (noting that the “theft and fraudulent use of the credit
cards” constitutes a second central “hub” of the scheme).
107 Id.
108 Hines-Flagg, 789 F.3d at 753 (“Hines-Flagg would travel to other states . . . to open
store credit card accounts and shop using the fraudulent identifications.”).
109 Savarese, 686 F.3d at 16 n.12.
110 Vega-Iturrino, 565 F.3d at 433.
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conclusions in unpublished opinions.111 But, in Hines-Flagg, the
Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, observing that
the relocation enhancement requires something more than a general intent to avoid detection.112 Thus, Hines-Flagg and Savarese
clearly differ as written, and aspects of one or the other will need
to be modified to resolve the circuit split.
C. The Nature-of-Scheme Approach
Lastly, the Third and Sixth Circuits have advanced what I
call the “nature-of-scheme approach.” In contrast to the two previous approaches, the nature-of-scheme approach does not tie the
location of a scheme to a fixed home base or set of actions. Rather,
the enhancement applies under the nature-of-scheme approach if
the crossjurisdictional trips meet certain criteria. For example, if
the trips spanned a certain geographic distance or provided a core
benefit to the scheme, then the relocation enhancement would apply under the nature-of-scheme approach.
The nature-of-scheme approach was first advanced by the
Third Circuit in United States v. Thung Van Huynh.113 Thung Van
Huynh involved the application of the relocation enhancement to
an identity-theft conspiracy. The defendant paid for stolen information from a car dealership in California, used that information
to create fake IDs, and gave those IDs to his coconspirators. These
coconspirators would then fly to other states, fraudulently purchase Rolex watches, and return to California to fence the
goods.114
The scheme in Thung Van Huynh bears a striking similarity
to the one in Hines-Flagg. Both schemes were designed to span
multiple jurisdictions, both schemes centered on a home base, and
both schemes crossed jurisdictional lines only in order to facilitate
fraudulent purchases. Nonetheless, the Third Circuit found that
the relocation enhancement applied.115 Unlike Hines-Flagg, who
111 See Braxton, 374 F. App’x at 249–50 (citing Vega-Iturrino, 565 F.3d at 433) (“[W]e
agree with the Government that the relocation need not be motivated by a specific threat
of arrest for [the relocation enhancement] to apply.” (emphasis in original)); Hessa, 464 F.
App’x at 475 (upholding application of the relocation enhancement because the defendant
“did not otherwise explain why he was traveling from location to location”).
112 Hines-Flagg, 789 F.3d at 756 (“[W]e believe application of [the relocation] enhancement requires more than just the operation of a multi-jurisdictional scheme in order to
reduce the chances of detection.”).
113 884 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2018).
114 Id. at 163.
115 Id. at 169.
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made fraudulent purchases in three contiguous states, nearly all
of Thung Van Huynh’s targets were “half the country apart.”116
Though the Third Circuit noted that “mere geographic distance
. . . is not dispositive,” it found that the “geographic scope of the
conspiracy and the dispersed nature of the locations to which the
co-conspirators traveled” mattered for the application of the relocation enhancement.117 In particular, these factors cast doubt on
the defendant’s argument that the out-of-state trips merely constituted an “expansion of the conspiracy, not a relocation to avoid
detection.” 118 On these grounds, the Third Circuit concluded that
the relocation enhancement applied, endorsing the idea that the
crossjurisdictional trips themselves—and the distance covered by
those trips—can inform the interpretation of the enhancement.119
The Sixth Circuit implemented a much broader version of the
nature-of-scheme approach in United States v. Woodson.120 In
Woodson, the Sixth Circuit considered a scheme much like the one
considered in Hines-Flagg—it involved committing fraudulent
acts in multiple states and then fencing the ill-gotten goods from
a home base.121 But the Sixth Circuit placed little reliance on precedent from sister circuits, focusing its analysis on the relocation
enhancement’s text instead. Noting that the word “scheme” commonly refers to “intangible plans and concerted actions between
co-conspirators,”122 the court found that “a scheme is primarily the
criminal agreement between co-conspirators rather than the
physical headquarters from which the enterprise operates.”123
Reasoning from this definition, the court “decline[d] to adopt a
categorical rule that the existence of a base of operations consistently utilized by conspirators to carry out portions of their scheme
. . . precludes application of the [relocation] enhancement.”124 Instead, the court reasoned, “‘where travel to other jurisdictions’ to

116 Id. at 168 (citing Brief for Appellant at 22, Thung Van Huynh, 884 F.3d 160
(No. 17-2417)).
117 Id.
118 Thung Van Huynh, 884 F.3d at 167–68 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 10, Thung
Van Huynh, 884 F.3d 160 (No. 17-2417)).
119 Id. at 168–69.
120 960 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2020).
121 Id. at 853.
122 Id. at 855 (citing Scheme, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://perma.cc/6SM5-XFFK;
Scheme, DICTIONARY.COM, https://perma.cc/248B-VT8U; Scheme, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)).
123 Id.
124 Id.
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avoid detection by law enforcement is ‘a key component of a fraud
scheme,’ the enhancement applies.”125 Read literally, this holding
would make the relocation enhancement applicable to every
scheme designed to operate in multiple jurisdictions.126
Like previously discussed cases in the circuit split, both
Thung Van Huynh and Woodson purport to be in accord with at
least some of the other approaches advanced by other circuits.127
But, as was the case with Savarese and Hines-Flagg, these claims
of accord do not withstand scrutiny. For example, Thung Van
Huynh states that Hines-Flagg and Morris are “distinguishable”
from the present case because the scheme at issue involved the
greater distances between locations.128 But, while all three cases
distinguish the expansion of a scheme from the relocation of a
scheme, Morris never references the distance covered by the defendant’s interstate trips, focusing instead on the centrality of the
scheme’s home base.129 Similarly, the Woodson court states that
its holding “is in accord with that of the First Circuit in United
States v. Savarese.”130 However, Savarese applied the enhancement because the defendant committed the same set of important
acts in multiple jurisdictions.131 Woodson, on the other hand,
treats relocation itself like the heart of the enterprise—no particular instance of relocation needs to occur because the scheme itself is built on the idea of relocating. Thus, Thung Van Huynh and
Woodson subtly shift the interpretive question from where a
scheme is located to how the defendants set up their multijurisdictional scheme.

125 Woodson, 960 F.3d at 855 (quoting United States v. Thornton, 718 F. App’x 399,
403–04 (6th Cir. 2018)).
126 Courts could cabin this interpretation by narrowing the definition of “key component.” Thornton, 718 F. App’x at 404. The scheme in Woodson involved elaborate jewelry
store heists, which required Woodson and his coconspirators to interact with store clerks.
Woodson, 960 F.3d at 853. Because this heist plan “seemingly would only work once in a
given area,” relocation could be more central to Woodson’s scheme than a run-of-the-mill
credit card scam. Id. at 856. But the language used in Woodson originally comes from a
Sixth Circuit case that involved simple thefts and check forgeries. See Thornton, 718 F.
App’x at 400. If travel across jurisdictions constituted a key component of this scheme,
then it could constitute a key component of many multijurisdictional schemes.
127 See Thung Van Huynh, 884 F.3d at 168 & n.3 (distinguishing Hines-Flagg and
Morris); Woodson, 960 F.3d at 885–86 (distinguishing Savarese).
128 Thung Van Huynh, 884 F.3d at 168 & n.3.
129 Compare id. at 168–69, with Morris, 153 F. App’x at 558, and Hines-Flagg, 789
F.3d at 755.
130 Woodson, 960 F.3d at 855.
131 Savarese, 686 F.3d at 15.
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Thung Van Huynh and Woodson also deepen the circuit split
regarding the intent element of the relocation enhancement. Both
cases have language favoring a general reading of the intent requirement,132 echoing earlier unpublished opinions from the Third
and Sixth Circuits favoring this approach.133 But more fundamentally, the nature-of-scheme approach can only work if courts read
“to evade law enforcement” as requiring a general intent to avoid
detection. To illustrate this point, consider the evidence of intent
discussed in Paredes. In that case, the court found that the defendant acted with the requisite intent because he crossed jurisdictional lines after his coconspirator’s arrest to avoid a specific
law enforcement investigation.134 This type of fact pattern could
plausibly be read as a necessary condition of the relocation enhancement, which specifically mentions evading law enforcement.135 But on the Sixth Circuit’s reading in Woodson, the relocation enhancement can apply to a defendant as soon as she forms
a plan that centers on moving between federal districts. At this
point, her actions could not relate to any specific law enforcement
investigation into the planned scheme—her plan has yet to get
underway. To sustain the Sixth Circuit’s reading of
§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(A), therefore, we must read the phrase “to evade law
enforcement” as referring to a general desire to avoid detection.
III. INTERPRETING THE RELOCATION ENHANCEMENT
This Part uses interpretive tools to determine how to apply
the relocation enhancement. Part III.A employs textual analysis,

132 See Thung Van Huynh, 884 F.3d at 169 (citing Savarese, 686 F.3d at 16 n.12)
(“Further supporting the District Court’s determination that the scheme was relocated to
evade the authorities was Huynh’s decision, with one exception, to target each store only
once.”); Woodson, 960 F.3d at 856 (finding that the defendant and his coconspirators possessed the requisite intent because “their scheme seemingly would only work once in a
given area. . . . Relocating to different jurisdictions to avoid detection was thus an integral
part of Woodson’s criminal conduct”). Notably, the Thung Van Huynh court observed that
the evidence on the record could satisfy Hines-Flagg’s heightened intent requirement,
given the defendant’s elaborate travel plans and the fact that he left states after encountering law enforcement on multiple occasions. Thung Van Huynh, 884 F.3d at 169. But
Thung Van Huynh also cites Savarese’s intent analysis with approval, suggesting that
more general showings of intent could suffice in the future. Id. (citing Savarese, 686 F.3d
at 16 n.12).
133 See supra note 111.
134 Paredes, 461 F.3d at 1192.
135 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(10)(A) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(applying a sentencing enhancement if “the defendant relocated . . . a fraudulent scheme
to another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement”).
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focusing in particular on the canon of statutory surplusage. The
canon has the clearest implications for the intent requirement of
the relocation enhancement. Specifically, the canon demonstrates
that the relocation enhancement requires something more than a
general intent to evade law enforcement. In addition, the canon
shows that the sophisticated-means enhancement already contemplates punishing multijurisdictional schemes more harshly.
The remaining sections use additional materials to flesh out
these points. Part III.B draws on Commission commentary to establish what level of intent the relocation enhancement requires,
concluding that a defendant must “know or suspect that [law] enforcement authorities have discovered the scheme” before the enhancement can apply.136 Part III.C then explores some existing
scholarship on deterrence and detection avoidance. This literature shows that the sophisticated-means enhancement is better
suited for deterring the creation of multijurisdictional schemes
than the relocation enhancement is, favoring a more cabined interpretation of the relocation enhancement.
A. Textual Interpretation
1. The plain meaning of the relocation enhancement.
Two decisions in the circuit split over multijurisdictional
schemes—Morris and Woodson—place a large emphasis on dictionary definitions and the ordinary meaning of the relocation enhancement.137 Ironically, these two cases reach opposite conclusions about what the enhancement requires. This divergence
results from each circuit employing a cabined method of textual
analysis, focusing on only some of the text at issue. In Morris, the
Eleventh Circuit focused on the definition of the word “relocate”
when analyzing the relocation enhancement, and it found that
the word ordinarily means to “establish or lay out in a new
place.” 138 In order for something to have been laid out in a new
place, the object must have had a concrete location in the first
place. Unsurprisingly, then, the Morris court focused its analysis
on where the scheme was located, ultimately locating the scheme

136

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 577 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2003).
See Morris, 153 F. App’x at 558; Woodson, 960 F.3d at 855.
138 Morris, 153 F. App’x at 558 (quoting Relocate, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976)).
137
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at a fixed home base.139 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit in Woodson
drilled down on the definition of the word “scheme” and found
that the word referred to “intangible plans and concerted actions
between co-conspirators.”140 Because a scheme is intangible, the
Sixth Circuit found that relocating a scheme did not require the
defendant to move a tangible, fixed home base. Instead, the relocation enhancement applies whenever travel to other jurisdictions is a “key component” of the scheme.141 In short, these circuits’ constructions of the relocation enhancement largely turned
on which word—“relocate” or “scheme”—they chose to emphasize.
The obvious solution to this problem would be to have courts
consider the definitions of both words at once when interpreting
the relocation enhancement. But this proposal comes with its own
problems. A significant tension exists between the dictionary definitions of the words “relocate” and “scheme.” If “relocate” means
“to lay out in a new place,” then the object being relocated must
have some sort of identifiable location in the first place; but how
can one localize a “scheme” if it entirely consists of intangible
plans? The problem is by no means insuperable. Courts could
assign a fixed location to an amorphous entity through a courtcreated rule, like the Supreme Court did by confining a corporation’s residence to its “nerve center” for purposes of personal jurisdiction.142 But no such rule exists for the relocation enhancement;
dictionary definitions, standing alone, cannot provide one.
A plain meaning approach to relocation enhancement’s intent
element creates similar problems. The meaning of the phrase “to
evade law enforcement” contains some ambiguity, as it could refer
to the general avoidance of law enforcement authorities or the
specific choice to flee a particular group of pursuers.143 Again,
139 Id. at 558 (finding the relocation enhancement inapplicable because the “[d]efendant always returned to the Northern District of Georgia”).
140 Woodson,
960
F.3d
at
855
(citing
Scheme,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://perma.cc/6SM5-XFFK; Scheme, DICTIONARY.COM, https://perma.cc/248B-VT8U;
Scheme, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)).
141 Id. (quoting United States v. Thornton, 718 F. App’x 399, 403–04 (6th Cir. 2018)).
142 See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). One can imagine a court—or
the Commission—handing down a similar rule regarding the location of a fraudulent
scheme. In fact, I propose such a rule below to resolve the relocation circuit split. See infra
Part IV.B.
143 See Evade, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://perma.cc/RD8D-Y8J9 (noting that “evade”
can be a transitive or intransitive verb); Law Enforcement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019) (noting that “law enforcement” can refer to “[t]he detection and punishments of
violations of the law” or “[p]olice officers and other members of the executive branch . . .
charged with carrying out and enforcing the criminal law”).
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different courts have different intuitions about which definition
of “to evade law enforcement” should prevail in this context.144
Moreover, the intent provision does not have a common law history
that courts can draw upon, and it does not employ terms of art to
differentiate between levels of intent.145 As a result, courts have
to turn to more complex methods of interpretation to determine
the meaning of the relocation enhancement’s intent element.
2. Canons of statutory interpretation.
When dictionary definitions fail to solve an interpretive problem, judges will often turn to canons of statutory interpretation.146
These canons act as “rules of thumb . . . that help users of legal
language discern meaning.”147 Though some of these rules of
thumb prove more divisive than others, many judges—including
textualists—maintain that certain canons are valid interpretive
tools,148 and they continue to use them frequently when settling
interpretive questions.149 This includes questions surrounding the
interpretation of sentencing enhancements.150

144 Compare Hines-Flagg, 789 F.3d at 756 (“[M]ost criminal enterprises are set up to
avoid getting caught. Based upon the plain language of the Guideline, we believe application
of this enhancement requires more than just the operation of a multi-jurisdictional scheme
in order to reduce the chances of detection.”), with Savarese, 686 F.3d at 16 n.12 (“The
evidence supports an inference that the defendants avoided returning to the same health
clubs . . . because the likelihood of detection would otherwise have increased substantially.”).
145 For an example of a system that links certain intent requirements to particular
terms of art, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. L. INST. 1985) (using the words “purposely,” “knowingly,” “recklessly,” and “negligently” to define different levels of mens rea).
146 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 663
(1990) (“The new textualists . . . seek a revival of canons that rest upon precepts of grammar and logic, proceduralism, and federalism.”); Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation,
and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts
Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. 71, 79 (2018) (“Interpretive canon use is associated
with textualist approaches to statutory interpretation.”).
147 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2465 n.285 (2003).
148 See Eskridge, supra note 146, at 663–64. For a list of canons endorsed by two
prominent textualists, see generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
149 See Mendelson, supra note 146, at 99 (“Majority opinions [in the first decade of the
Roberts Court] considered . . . at least one canon in roughly 70% of contested statutory
issues.”).
150 See, e.g., United States v. Herrera, 974 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing
United States v. Soberanes, 318 F.3d 959, 963 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003)) (“Canons of statutory
construction can also guide the interpretation [of the Sentencing Guidelines].”).
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One canon frequently employed by judges is the canon of statutory surplusage.151 The surplusage canon counsels that “every
word and every provision in a legal instrument is to be given effect.”152 In the context of § 2B1.1(b)(10), only one enhancement can
apply to a defendant’s case.153 Therefore, the surplusage canon
would advise courts to prevent the three relevant enhancements—the relocation enhancement, the international enhancement, and the sophisticated-means enhancement—from becoming redundant or subsuming one another. Note that this canon
applies not only to each enhancement taken as a whole but also
to each word within each enhancement. If an interpretation reads
a word or clause out of a statute by making it redundant or nugatory, it violates the surplusage canon.154
Applying this canon helps elucidate the intent element of the
relocation enhancement. As noted in Part II, several circuits read
the phrase “to evade law enforcement” to merely require a general
intent to evade law enforcement.155 But the relocation enhancement is the only provision in § 2B1.1(b)(10) to include the phrase
“to evade law enforcement.”156 Therefore, in order for the generalintent reading of the relocation enhancement to withstand
scrutiny under the surplusage canon, it must give the phrase a
meaning independent from the intent requirements of the international and sophisticated-means enhancements. Otherwise,
there would be no need to include the phrase at all.
The general-intent reading fails this test. The sophisticatedmeans enhancement already requires this type of general intent
to avoid detection. The application notes to § 2B1.1(b)(10) state
that the conduct constituting sophisticated means must “pertai[n]
to the execution or concealment of an offense.”157 And while all
151 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 148, at 174 (noting that the surplusage canon
is a valid interpretive tool for all texts); Mendelson, supra note 146, at 101 tbl.1 (showing
that the surplusage canon was the third-most discussed canon in the first decade of the
Roberts Court, appearing in 13.2% of cases involving contested statutory issues).
152 Surplusage Canon, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Yates v.
United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015) (“We resist a reading of [a provision] that would
render superfluous an entire provision passed in proximity as part of the same Act.”).
153 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 577 cmt. (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2003) (noting that § 2B1.1(b)(10) includes “three alternative provisions”).
154 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 148, at 176 (“Because legal drafters should not
include words that have no effect, courts avoid a reading that renders some words altogether
redundant.”).
155 See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
156 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(10)(A) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
157 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
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aspects of a scheme’s execution may not specifically aim at detection avoidance, they all generally help the schemers maintain a
low profile. Many courts recognize this reality in practice, noting
that concern about the concealment of crime is the driving force
behind the sophisticated-means enhancement.158 Thus, a generalintent reading of the phrase “to evade law enforcement” would
essentially read the phrase out of § 2B1.1(b)(10), something
which the surplusage canon forbids.
The surplusage canon also sheds some light on what it means
to relocate a multijurisdictional scheme. Recall that the Sixth
Circuit has held that the relocation enhancement can apply based
on the nature of the scheme alone—if the scheme centers on
travel between federal jurisdictions, the relocation enhancement
applies.159 But the application notes to § 2B1.1(b)(10) explain
that these types of schemes could just as easily be subject to the
sophisticated-means enhancement. The notes state, in pertinent
part: “[I]n a telemarketing scheme, locating the main office of
the scheme in one jurisdiction but locating soliciting operations
in another jurisdiction ordinarily indicates sophisticated
means.”160 Unsurprisingly, many courts have read this language
to mean that any type of multijurisdictional operation can satisfy the sophisticated-means enhancement.161 Reading the

158 See United States v. Valdez, 726 F.3d 684, 695 (5th Cir. 2013) (reversing application of the sophisticated-means enhancement because “there is no indication that” the defendant’s conduct “could have made it more difficult for his offense . . . to be detected”);
United States v. Mendez, 420 F. App’x 933, 938 (11th Cir. 2011) (“In each case in which
we have upheld the application of a sophisticated-means enhancement, the defendant
used false identities, fraudulent accounts, or fictitious entities to conceal his participation
in the scheme or to execute and conceal the fraudulent transactions.”); United States v.
Hulse, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1226 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (“[I]t appears that concealment from
authorities is at the core of [the] sophisticated-means enhancement.”).
159 Woodson, 960 F.3d at 855. While Thung Van Huynh also follows the nature-ofscheme approach, it does not demand the same type of categorical result. Thung Van
Huynh, 884 F.3d at 169 (holding that “the District Court did not clearly err in considering
the geographic scope of the conspiracy”). But an extension of its principles would arguably
lead to the same result that Woodson reaches. Even if the travel between jurisdictions
needs to meet some nebulous distance requirement before the relocation enhancement can
apply, the test still allows courts to apply the enhancement based on the mere existence
of a multijurisdictional scheme.
160 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
161 See United States v. Johnson, 732 F. App’x 638, 663 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[S]omething
as simple as [a] multi-state location may constitute ‘sophisticated means.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting No. 11-501, 2016 WL 4120778, at *6 (D. Utah July 28, 2016)));
see also United States v. Evano, 553 F.3d 109, 112–13 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that a multistate fraud operation involved sophisticated means); United States v. Jenkins, 578 F.3d
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relocation enhancement to apply in the same way—as the Third
and Sixth Circuits do—renders the provision largely superfluous.
Of course, the surplusage canon is not the only available interpretive canon. The Third and Sixth Circuit could parry this
analysis with a countercanon. For example, these circuits could observe that § 2B1.1(b)(10) provides for an increased sentencing level
if the relocation enhancement applies “or [ ] the offense otherwise
involved sophisticated means.”162 Invoking the canon of noscitur a
sociis, they could then argue that relocating a scheme is just one
of many sophisticated means, allowing the provisions to overlap.163 I could parry, in turn, with a counter-countercanon of
ejusdem generis, noting that courts generally disfavor using general terms to govern the construction of specific provisions,164 and
so on. This sort of back-and-forth illustrates Professor Karl
Llewellyn’s well-known criticism that “there are two opposing
canons on almost every point.”165 I maintain that the surplusage
canon predominates in this exercise, but reasonable minds could
disagree.
At the very least, the surplusage canon highlights two things
that courts should keep in mind when interpreting the relocation
enhancement within § 2B1.1(b)(10). First, courts cannot read the
relocation enhancement to merely require a general intent to
avoid detection; the government must make a greater showing of
intent in order for the enhancement to apply. This insight affirms
the Seventh Circuit’s reading of the intent element166 while disputing the contrary reading advanced by the First, Third, and
Sixth Circuits.167 Second, courts can still address the dangers
posed by multijurisdictional schemes through the sophisticatedmeans enhancement. In fact, a court might have stronger textual
745, 751–52 (8th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Gadsden, 628 F. App’x 639, 642 (11th
Cir. 2015) (same).
162 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
163 See Noscitur a sociis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“[T]he meaning of
an unclear word or phrase, esp[ecially] one in a list, should be determined by the words
immediately surrounding it.”).
164 See Yates, 574 U.S. at 545 (“[W]here general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are [usually] construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Wash. State Dept. of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Est.
of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 384 (2003))).
165 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
166 See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
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grounds to apply this enhancement to multijurisdictional
schemes, since the commentary on the sophisticated-means enhancement appears to specifically contemplate multijurisdictional coordination.168 Thus, prosecutors in the Third and Sixth
Circuits could maintain the practical effects of Thung Van Huynh
and Woodson by seeking alternative enhancements.
B. Amendment Notes to the Relocation Enhancement
The foregoing textual analysis demonstrates that the relocation enhancement requires something more than a general intent
to avoid detection, but it does not clarify what that something more
should be. This textual analysis thus leaves courts and prosecutors
with an important question: What showing of intent needs to be
made before the relocation enhancement can apply?
The Commission’s explanation for adding the relocation enhancement to the Guidelines provides an answer. As mentioned
in Part I.B, the advisory notes to § 2B1.1(b)(10) do not provide any
concrete definitions for the terms “relocate a scheme” or “to evade
law enforcement.”169 But application notes do not represent the
entirety of the Commission’s statements on any particular guideline. The Commission also provides amendment notes when it
proposes an amendment to the Guidelines, explaining the need
for and the rationale behind the new amendment. While these
amendment notes do not appear as part of the commentary following each individual guideline, they are submitted to Congress
during the amendment process.170 Therefore, amendment notes
reflect the official position of the Commission and can lend some
insight into the interpretive problems surrounding the Guidelines.
Viewed in this light, the notes to Amendment 577—the
amendment implementing § 2B1.1(b)(10)—help resolve the circuit split surrounding the intent element of the relocation enhancement. The notes state that “testimony offered at a Commission
hearing on telemarketing fraud indicated that telemarketers often
relocate their schemes to other jurisdictions once they know or
suspect that [law] enforcement authorities have discovered the
scheme. [This] type[ ] of conduct [is] specifically covered by the
168

See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
170 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (allowing the Commission to amend the Guidelines and requiring that “an amendment or modification [ ] be accompanied by a statement of the reasons
therefor”).
169

1494

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:6

new enhancement.”171 These comments confirm what the surplusage canon suggested: the relocation enhancement requires more
than a general desire to avoid detection. In fact, they call for
something close to specific intent. On the Commission’s reading,
the defendant must flee across jurisdictional lines while knowing
or suspecting that she is under a law enforcement investigation.
Moreover, this intent to avoid detection must arise from the specific scheme at issue; the enhancement would not apply to defendants who make an elaborate scheme because they know or suspect
that they are already under investigation for something else.
If amendment notes were simply a piece of legislative history,
then they would not be given much weight by courts. But the
Commission is a federal agency, and agency interpretations of
their own rules receive considerable deference from courts. More
specifically, under Auer v. Robbins,172 agency interpretations of
their own rules are given controlling weight unless they are
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”173 This
standard is extremely deferential to federal agencies, matching
the deference accorded to agency interpretations of statutes under the Chevron standard.174 And, in Stinson v. United States,175
the Supreme Court held that courts should show similar deference
to Commission commentary regarding the Guidelines.176 Thus,
courts have firm ground to read the relocation enhancement as

171

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 577 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2003).
519 U.S. 452 (1997).
173 Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
359 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring)). The Supreme Court recently clarified that agency
interpretations will only receive Auer deference if the interpretation at issue remains “genuinely ambiguous” after courts “exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.” Kisor v.
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)). “To make that effort, a court must ‘carefully consider[ ]’
the text, structure, history, and purpose of a regulation.” Id., 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting
Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). The
relocation enhancement remains genuinely ambiguous after using these tools. See supra
Introduction (examining history); supra Part III.A.1 (examining text); supra Part III.A.2
(examining structure through canons); infra Part III.C (examining purpose). Even if this
were not the case, the Commission’s amendment note would still have the “power to persuade,” given its thorough consideration by the Commission and its consistency over time.
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
174 See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (“Under Auer, as under Chevron, the agency’s reading
must fall ‘within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.’” (quoting City of Arlington v.
FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013))).
175 508 U.S. 36 (1993).
176 See id. at 45 (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
172
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applying only to cases where the defendant relocates a scheme to
avoid a known or suspected law enforcement investigation.177
Admittedly, Stinson involved a different form of Commission
guidance than the amendment notes examined here. In Stinson,
the Court evaluated a formal application note that the Sentencing
Commission intended to clarify a particular guideline.178 The
amendment notes evaluated in this Comment, by contrast, is an
appendix entry merely explaining why the Commission chose to
amend the Guidelines.
The Guideline Manual itself belies this distinction, however.
“Portions of this document not labeled as guidelines or commentary also express the policy of the Commission or provide guidance as to the interpretation and application of the guidelines,”
the manual states.179 “These are to be construed as commentary
and thus have the force of policy statements.”180 In light of these
statements, it is unsurprising that federal courts show deference
to explanatory amendment notes when interpreting their corresponding guidelines.181
Thus, both the surplusage canon and relevant Commission
statements suggest that the relocation enhancement requires
specific intent. To the extent that the First, Third, and Sixth
Circuits suggest otherwise, they are mistaken. This observation
proves especially problematic for the nature-of-scheme approach
advanced by the Third and Sixth Circuits, as I will discuss in further detail below.182
C. Deterrence, Linkage, and Recursivity
The textual analysis in Part III.A also demonstrates that
courts may not need to use the relocation enhancement to punish
multijurisdictional schemes. Instead, courts can—and, to a
177 Granted, Stinson predated the sweeping changes made to the federal sentencing
landscape by Booker and its progeny. But the decision remains good law; federal circuit
courts continue to cite the decision with approval. See, e.g., United States v. Jett, 982 F.3d
1072, 1078 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Henry, 968 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2020).
178 Stinson, 508 U.S. at 39.
179 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.7 cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
180 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.7 cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
181 See United States v. Diaz-Diaz, 135 F.3d 572, 581 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a
court must adhere to an amendment’s explanatory notes unless they are “plainly at odds
with the Guidelines”). For examples of circuit courts using amendment notes to interpret
the Guidelines, see United States v. Ladeau, 688 F. App’x 342, 349–50 (6th Cir. 2017);
United States v. Clayton, 172 F.3d 347, 355 (5th Cir. 1999).
182 See infra Part IV.A.
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certain extent, already do—punish multijurisdictional schemes
through the sophisticated-means enhancement. I argue here
that this is a positive aspect of § 2B1.1(b)(10). Not only does the
sophisticated-means enhancement have a better textual justification for addressing multijurisdictional schemes than the relocation enhancement,183 but it can also better effectuate the purposes
of § 2B1.1(b)(10). Therefore, to the extent that the overlap between the relocation enhancement and the sophisticated-means
enhancement poses a problem for courts, they should resolve it by
limiting the application of the former and expanding the application of the latter.
The clearest purpose underlying the § 2B1.1(b)(10) enhancements appears to be deterrence of concealment efforts, also
known as “detection avoidance.”184 The statute that led to the creation of the relocation enhancement—the Telemarketing Fraud
Prevention Act of 1998 (TFPA)—instructed the Commission to
“provide an additional appropriate sentencing enhancement, if
the offense involved sophisticated means, including but not limited
to sophisticated concealment efforts.”185 The Commission then
added the language found at § 2B1.1(b)(10) to the Guidelines,
noting that it did so to increase sentences “for fraud offenses that
involve conduct . . . that makes it difficult for law enforcement
authorities to discover the offense or apprehend the offender.”186
While the TFPA also put forward some retributivist reasons for increasing fraud crime sentences,187 these purposes can be accounted
for by different sentencing enhancements,188 and there is little
reason to think that the § 2B1.1(b)(10) enhancements effectuate
a separate retributivist purpose. As such, the practical value of

183

See supra text accompanying notes 160–61.
See generally Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1331 (2006).
185 Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act § 6(c)(2), 112 Stat. at 521.
186 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 577 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2003).
187 See Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act § 6(c)(3), 112 Stat. at 521 (instructing
the Commission to “provide an additional appropriate sentencing enhancement for cases
in which a large number of vulnerable victims . . . are affected by a fraudulent scheme”);
see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-158, at 2–3 (1997), as reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 227, 228
(citing a need to protect “elderly victims” and “strike[ ] back at crooked telemarketers” to
justify the passage of the TFPA).
188 See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018) (providing for increased penalties if a fraud offense involved “a misrepresentation
that the defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious, or political
organization, or a government agency”).
184
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the enhancements should be judged by how well they deter detection avoidance.
This purpose fits squarely within the law-and-economics
view of criminal justice, which focuses on deterrence.189 Generally
speaking, economic models of crime view criminality as the result
of a cost-benefit analysis, where expected costs are a function of
the probability of getting caught and the penalty that will result.190 Efforts to avoid detection—like scheme relocations or the
use of sophisticated means—affect this model by reducing the
probability of getting caught, thereby decreasing the expected
costs of crime and increasing the expected return for criminal
acts. Accordingly, to deter would-be fraudsters, the government
should increase the penalties for defendants who have engaged in
detection avoidance in order to bring the expected return on crime
back down to zero.191
At first glance, each enhancement in § 2B1.1(b)(10) adheres
closely to this framework. Each enhancement deals with an action
that reduces a defendant’s chances of getting caught and increases
her expected return from fraudulent activity. The enhancements,
in turn, subject defendants to longer sentences when they take
these actions by increasing their recommended sentencing
ranges. In theory, then, all three enhancements would drive down
the expected return of fraudulent schemes, deterring rational actors from taking part in these schemes in the first place.
The effectiveness of a sentencing enhancement, however, can
turn on how and when it takes effect. Professor Miriam Baer’s
account of the “linkage” factor provides a clear example of this

189 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 176 (1968) (“[A]n increase in a person’s probability of conviction or punishment
if convicted would generally decrease . . . the number of offenses he commits.”); Steven
Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1243–46 (1985) (explaining that “the optimal sanction” is higher
when the probability of apprehending a criminal is lower or the benefits from crime are
greater).
190 See Becker, supra note 189, at 176–77.
191 Notably, this model assumes that fraudsters are aware of the sentencing enhancements and make rational decisions in light of how those enhancements could apply. This
is a strong assumption, and even some law-and-economics scholars have begun to question
whether potential offenders can accurately weigh the costs and benefits of crime. See
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1538–41 (1998). But the assumption is thought to be
more palatable in the context of fraud crimes, where would-be perpetrators generally plan
their schemes with an eye toward maximizing their expected return. See Miriam H. Baer,
Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1309–10 (2008).
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principle. Linkage, as Baer defines it, is “the extent to which the
cessation of new criminal conduct increases the perceived likelihood of detection and punishment for previous instances of criminal conduct.”192 This linkage effect will be especially pronounced
for “mid-fraud perpetrators,” since fraudsters in the midst of a
scheme often must rely on continuing criminal acts to prevent the
discovery of past criminal acts.193 In these cases, increased sanctions will have a very low deterrent effect on the defendant. At
this point, she will no longer weigh the expected penalty against
the expected reward. She will instead weigh the expected costs of
giving up (which have just been increased by the enhancement)
against the expected costs of continuing with the scheme (which
will be heavily discounted).194 This skewed balancing calculation
will likely come out in favor of continued criminality.
In addition, sentencing enhancements that target detection
avoidance can foster more detection avoidance once incurred.
Professor Chris William Sanchirico notes that when defendants
face additional penalties for concealing wrongdoing, a small
amount of concealment will beget more concealment.195 Sanchirico
elaborates:
This is what people do. They do not simply lie. They lie about
lying. And if you accuse them of that, they lie about lying
about lying. . . . Cover-up is covered up in a chain of effectively infinite length: a chain, that is, always one link longer
than the pursuer is willing to follow it.196
Thus, sentencing enhancements that punish midscheme coverups foster future criminality in two ways. They encourage

192

Baer, supra note 191, at 1321.
See id. at 1329. Baer bases this observation in part on the continuing presence of
the defendant at the corporation she is defrauding and on repeat interactions between the
defendant and her victims. Id. at 1326–29. These characteristics may not be present in
credit card schemes, like the ones at issue in several of the circuit-split cases. See id. at
1328–29 (“[T]here are numerous crimes (including many variations of online or credit card
frauds) for which the perpetrator’s absence decreases the likelihood of detection.”). But
other aspects of those schemes can create a linkage problem, such as the ease of committing federal fraud crimes and the difficulty of terminating a multijurisdictional scheme.
See id. at 1322–26. Moreover, § 2B1.1(b)(10) would apply equally to the types of workplace
fraud that Baer contemplates in her article. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. A
(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (connecting wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), bank fraud (18
U.S.C. § 1344), and securities fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1348) to the provisions of § 2B1.1).
194 See Baer, supra note 191, at 1330–32.
195 See Sanchirico, supra note 184, at 1368–69.
196 Id. at 1367–68.
193
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defendants to carry on with their schemes and to engage in
higher-order cover-ups.
In light of these observations, the relocation enhancement
provides the least deterrent benefit out of the enhancements in
§ 2B1.1(b)(10), since it can only take effect during the course of
the scheme. The typical defendant presumably chooses to operate
out of another country or use sophisticated means at the outset of
her scheme. But, under the Commission’s reading of the relocation enhancement, a defendant can only relocate her scheme to
avoid a known or suspected investigation once that scheme has
gotten underway.197 Accordingly, the relocation enhancement’s
deterrent effects will be mitigated by the strong linkage effects
and the recursive nature of detection avoidance. If courts want to
effectuate the deterrent purposes of § 2B1.1(b)(10), they should
instead focus on the international and sophisticated-means enhancements, which defendants can consider before they begin
committing fraudulent acts. Readings that make more liberal use
of these provisions, therefore, should generally be favored over
readings that make liberal use of the relocation enhancement.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE CIRCUIT SPLITS
This final Part walks through three specific recommendations that follow from the analysis in Part III. First, Part IV.A argues that courts should reject the nature-of-scheme approach advanced by the Third and Sixth Circuits. Put simply, their
approach conflicts with the construction of the relocation enhancement suggested by the use of the surplusage canon and the
Commission’s amendment note, which calls for specific intent to
evade law enforcement.
This observation, however, does not completely settle the circuit split. The two remaining approaches—the home-base approach and the key-acts approach—can both coexist with a specificintent requirement. To address this lingering conflict, Part IV.B
proposes a new standard for applying the relocation enhancement
to multijurisdictional schemes. Specifically, the relocation
197 Granted, this understanding assumes that the statutory canons and Commission
amendment note discussed above control the meaning of the relocation enhancement. On
a contrary view—like the nature-of-scheme approach—a defendant could make choices at
the outset of her scheme that would trigger the relocation enhancement. See infra text
accompanying note 200. Even so, most cases involving the relocation enhancement should
involve decisions made during the course of the scheme, and the aforementioned deterrence issues will continue to pose a problem in these cases.
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enhancement should only apply when a defendant (1) commits an
act of deception, (2) flees across jurisdictional lines to avoid a specific law enforcement investigation, and (3) begins deceiving new
victims in another district. This rule adds consistency and clarity
to this area of criminal sentencing while limiting the applicability
of the relocation enhancement to obvious cases.
Finally, Part IV.C shows that courts can engage in something
like the nature-of-scheme analysis while applying the sophisticatedmeans enhancement. This approach allows courts to adequately
deter sophisticated fraud schemes through legal arguments that
stand on much firmer ground. But courts should take care to not
read the sophisticated-means enhancement too broadly, as doing
so could reintroduce surplusage problems or render the enhancement meaningless. This Part concludes with an example of a
multijurisdictional scheme that should receive neither the relocation nor the sophisticated-means enhancement.
A. Courts Should Reject the Nature-of-Scheme Approach
As made clear by the preceding Part, courts should avoid
applying the relocation enhancement based on a showing of general intent. The home-base and key-acts approaches advanced in
the circuit split can accommodate this instruction.198 The natureof-scheme approach, however, cannot coexist with a specific-intent
requirement. Recall that the nature-of-scheme approach structurally depends on a general-intent reading of the relocation enhancement.199 If the relocation enhancement applies whenever
“travel to other jurisdictions . . . is a key component of [the] fraud
scheme,”200 then the enhancement can apply to schemes that have
been planned but not yet executed. But law enforcement cannot
investigate a scheme that has yet to get underway, nor could any
defendant know or suspect that law enforcement is onto her
fraudulent scheme before the scheme begins. It follows that any
future plans to establish a multijurisdictional scheme could not
be motivated by a specific intent to hide that very scheme from a
specific investigation. Thus, the specific-intent requirement
stands in tension with the notion that the relocation enhancement can apply to any scheme that centers on multijurisdictional
198

See infra Part IV.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 132–35.
200 Woodson, 960 F.3d at 855 (quoting United States v. Thornton, 718 F. App’x 399,
403–04 (6th Cir. 2018)).
199
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travel. To the extent that the Third and Sixth Circuits advance
that notion, they are mistaken.
A few caveats bear mentioning here. In some unique circumstances, a defendant might have a specific intent to evade law enforcement at the outset of her scheme. For example, a defendant
could reasonably know or suspect that law enforcement is investigating her for a different reason, and she could set up a multijurisdictional scheme in response to that fear. But, on the Commission’s reading, the relocation enhancement applies “once [the
defendant] know[s] or suspect[s] that [law] enforcement authorities have discovered the scheme” at issue,201 not when the defendant suspects that she is being investigated for something else.
This scenario, therefore, does not dispute the foregoing analysis.202
Of course, the planning of the scheme is, in some sense, a part
of the scheme. Law enforcement could, therefore, investigate the
scheme during its planning phase, and the relocation enhancement could arguably apply to the defendant if she crossed jurisdictional lines specifically to avoid that investigation. But this observation does not license the conclusion that the Third and Sixth
Circuits reach. These circuits would apply the enhancement so
long as the scheme involved relocation between jurisdictions in
the future, regardless of whether the defendant actively sought to
avoid law enforcement during its planning stages. That outcome
remains unaddressed by this observation, and it remains fundamentally at odds with the relocation enhancement’s structure and
the Commission’s amendment note. As such, future courts should
reject this reading.
B. Courts Should Apply the Relocation Enhancement to a
Narrow Set of Multijurisdictional Schemes
Rejecting the nature-of-scheme approach does not completely
resolve the circuit split; future decisions could still be torn between the home-base approach and the key-acts approach. This
Section will attempt to settle this additional dispute by adopting
a modified version of the key-acts approach that ensures
201 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 577 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2003)
(emphasis added).
202 Granted, courts will have to determine whether this second, multijurisdictional
scheme is truly a new scheme in its own right or merely a continuation of a previous
scheme. If it is a continuation of a previous scheme, then the relocation enhancement could
apply. But again, this does not challenge the foregoing analysis, since, by hypothesis, the
relocation takes place during the middle of the scheme.
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consistency in sentencing and avoids the problems involved with
broader constructions.
I begin by noting that the First and Seventh Circuits—the
main proponents of the key-acts and home-base approaches, respectively—maintain different ideas about what the intent element of the relocation enhancement requires. The First Circuit’s
decision in Savarese held that a general intent to avoid detection
can suffice, while the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hines-Flagg
called for something more.203 For reasons I have discussed at
length, I believe that the Seventh Circuit has the better side of
the argument, and the First Circuit should revise its doctrine
accordingly.
But this observation does not imply that courts should reject
Savarese in its entirety. Nothing in the First Circuit’s reasoning
intrinsically links the defendant’s intent to the location of the
fraudulent scheme in the way that the nature-of-scheme approach links the two. To put it another way, a court can argue
that a scheme is located where its key acts take place under either
theory of intent without creating a contradiction. If the relocation
enhancement calls for specific intent, the First Circuit can save
most of Savarese by simply analyzing intent more carefully going
forward. The same holds true of the home-base approach: courts
can reason that a scheme is located at its base of operations regardless of whether the relocation enhancement calls for a showing of
general or specific intent. Thus, the relocation enhancement’s
specific-intent requirement can rule out only the nature-ofscheme approach; it cannot decide between the two remaining approaches without invoking some other consideration.
When considered on their own merits, both the home-base
approach and the key-acts approach leave something to be desired. The key-acts approach has a strong intuitive appeal. If a
scheme is a set of “intangible plans and concerted actions between
co-conspirators,”204 then one might imagine that a scheme is located where those plans and actions are carried out. But Savarese
does not provide a good theory for what qualifies as a “key act”
under its standard, and that ambiguity invites different courts to
interpret the standard in different ways. We can already see this
happening within the circuit split itself: Savarese suggests that
the “theft and fraudulent use of [ ] credit cards” constituted “the
203
204

Compare Savarese, 686 F.3d at 16 n.12, with Hines-Flagg, 789 F.3d at 756–57.
Woodson, 960 F.3d at 855.
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heart of [Savarese’s] enterprise,”205 while Hines-Flagg—which
also involved identity theft and credit card fraud—found that
“the heart of [Hines-Flagg’s] enterprise” was her home base in
Detroit.206
These divergent results prove especially troubling because
the Guidelines were designed to avoid this sort of result. The
Commission’s enabling statute states that the Guidelines should
“provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing” and “avoid[ ] unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar criminal conduct.”207 But if courts continue to interpret the
key acts of a fraud scheme in divergent ways, then disparities will
arise. Defendants will face different sentences based solely on
where they happen to stand trial. This result directly contravenes
the purpose of the Guidelines, and it should be avoided through
the use of clearer standards.
The home-base approach, at first glance, appears to provide
these clearer standards. If a scheme revolves around a central,
permanent base of operations, courts should be able to identify
that hub—and any relocations of that hub—fairly easily. But this
approach could create some absurd results if taken to its logical
extreme. Consider a version of the scheme in Hines-Flagg in
which the defendants both stole identities and made fraudulent
purchases in other states before returning to Detroit. Detroit
would still be the only fixed location in the scheme, but virtually
no part of the fraudulent scheme would occur there—at most, the
defendants would sell some fraudulently purchased goods while
back home. Moreover, if courts attempted to solve the problem by
only calling a location the home base of the scheme if certain
fraudulent activities occur there, then the home-base approach
would collapse into the key-acts approach, reintroducing all the
aforementioned consistency problems. What actions would qualify?
How would courts ensure consistency across different schemes
and different circuits? The current cases provide no answer.
Ultimately, courts will need to turn to an external definition
or rule in order to solve these problems. I propose the following

205

Savarese, 686 F.3d at 15.
Hines-Flagg, 789 F.3d at 753, 756.
207 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (requiring the Commission to
pay “particular attention to the requirements of [28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)] for providing
certainty and fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentencing disparities”).
206
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rule: a fraudulent scheme is located wherever a member of that
scheme deliberately deceives another for personal gain. Therefore, if a defendant deceives someone in one federal district, flees
that district because of a known or suspected law enforcement investigation, and then takes up her deception in a new district, the
relocation enhancement applies.
This rule has three prominent strengths. First, the rule
would ensure a high degree of consistency and fairness in this
area of criminal sentencing. Because the rule draws upon carefully and narrowly defined factors, judges should find it easy to
apply in an efficient and impartial manner. Moreover, while the
statutory elements of various fraud crimes can differ in important
ways,208 each one should, by definition, involve an element of deception,209 making my rule generally applicable to all types of
fraud offenses.
Second, this rule would lessen the application of the relocation enhancement to multijurisdictional schemes, which should
prove beneficial for both the clarity of legal doctrine and overall
criminal deterrence. For the reasons discussed in Part III.A, the
relocation enhancement proves particularly difficult to parse
when applied to schemes that span multiple jurisdictions by design. In addition, the relocation enhancement has a number of
shortcomings when it comes to deterring future criminal activity,
as explained in Part III.C. Taken together, these realities counsel
in favor of limiting the relocation enhancement’s applicability to
208 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (allowing a conviction for wire fraud if the defendant
“transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any [communications] for the purpose of executing
[a] scheme”), with 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a) (allowing a conviction for identity theft if the defendant “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority” another person’s identification or a false identification document).
209 Cf. Fraud, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://perma.cc/6GUH-ANZJ (defining the word
as “an act of deceiving or misrepresenting”). In mail- and wire-fraud cases, the defendant’s
act—communication via the mail or wires—only needs to be “in furtherance” of the fraudulent scheme. Skye Lynn Perryman, Mail and Wire Fraud, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 715, 726–
27, 726 nn.75–78 (2006) (collecting cases). That is, the communication “need not be an
essential element of the scheme. . . . It is sufficient for the [communication] to be ‘incident
to an essential part of the scheme,’ or ‘a step in [the] plot.’” Schmuck v. United States, 489
U.S. 705, 710–11 (1989) (third alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); and then quoting Badders v. United States,
240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916)). Most of these communications should still involve some element
of deception, whether that relates to obtaining valuable goods or concealing the scheme.
Perryman, supra, at 723. But, in any case, a communication sufficient to give rise to a
mail- or wire-fraud conviction would suffice to meet the “act of deception” requirement in
my proposed test.
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the situations it was originally meant to cover, and my proposed
rule accomplishes that task.
Finally, this rule can draw on the other provisions of
§ 2B1.1(b)(10) to shore up its inherent limitations. For example,
one drawback of the proposed rule, which it shares with all clearcut legal rules, is that it will sometimes prove underinclusive.
Many illegal components of a scheme—such as the creation of
fake IDs—could be relocated across jurisdictional lines without
triggering the relocation enhancement under my proposed construction. But these actions would be subject to enhanced penalties
under the sophisticated-means enhancement, which provides the
same increase in offense level and (presumably) the same deterrent effect, a point on which I elaborate in the next Section.
C. Courts Should Apply the Sophisticated-Means
Enhancement to Multijurisdictional Schemes
Up to this point, my proposals have largely been grounded in
doctrine. But criminal sentencing should also attend to practical
concerns. After all, multijurisdictional schemes will almost certainly persist and continue to harm the public, and the solution
advanced in this Comment seems to prevent the relocation enhancement from addressing that problem. My solution, therefore,
arguably trades deterrent potential for doctrinal cleanliness.
Courts do not have to choose between a clear doctrine and effective deterrent measures, however. They can achieve both by addressing multijurisdictional schemes through the sophisticatedmeans enhancement. This enhancement allows courts to increase
a defendant’s sentence if she intentionally engaged in conduct
constituting “especially complex or especially intricate”210 ways of
committing fraud. Courts have already applied this enhancement
to certain multijurisdictional schemes,211 and they can continue to
do so without muddying the analytical waters surrounding the
relocation enhancement.
The facts of Thung Van Huynh illustrate this point. Recall
that the case involved a scheme in which coconspirators would fly
to far-off states, steal luxury watches using fraudulent information, and return to California to sell them.212 The Third Circuit
held that the relocation enhancement applied, reasoning that the
210
211
212

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
See supra note 161.
Thung Van Huynh, 884 F.3d at 163.
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“geographic scope” between jurisdictions provided some proof that
the crossjurisdictional trips constituted a relocation of the
scheme, as opposed to a mere “expansion of [ ] operations.”213 But
this reading does violence to the common meaning of the word
“relocate.” The distance between states should not influence
whether Thung Van Huynh relocated the scheme across jurisdictional lines; either he moved the scheme or he didn’t. Moreover, if
we extend the reasoning employed by the Third Circuit in this
case, we could reach a decision very much like Woodson, which
would create serious surplusage problems for the relocation enhancement. Finally, even if the case sidestepped these issues, it
would still face linkage and recursivity problems, which encourage “mid-fraud perpetrators” to avoid detection by committing additional criminal acts.214
Instead, the sentencing court could have simply relied on the
sophisticated-means enhancement. The key question under this
framework would have been whether the airline trips made the
scheme more intricate or complex than similar schemes. This
question is much more tractable than the question of where a
multijurisdictional scheme is really located. Furthermore, the enhancement could have applied based on the initial decision to use
interstate travel in the scheme, allowing the enhancement to
avoid the linkage problem. Thus, using the sophisticated-means
enhancement in this case would have provided a cleaner doctrinal
answer and also increased the deterrent effect of the sentencing
enhancement.
In fact, a court could almost rehabilitate Woodson’s natureof-scheme approach through use of the sophisticated-means enhancement. All that a court would need to do is hold that setting
up a multijurisdictional scheme categorically constitutes the use
of sophisticated means. The court would have a colorable legal
argument for doing so: the commentary to § 2B1.1(b)(10) appears
to provide some justification for this stance,215 and some courts
have already suggested such a rule.216

213

Id. at 168.
See supra notes 192–97 and accompanying text.
215 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018) (“[I]n a telemarketing scheme, locating the main office of the scheme in one jurisdiction but locating soliciting operations in another jurisdiction ordinarily indicates sophisticated means.”).
216 See supra note 161.
214
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I would caution against applying the enhancement quite so
broadly, however, since broad application of a guideline can have
adverse consequences. For example, if courts read the sophisticatedmeans enhancement to apply to every case involving multijurisdictional travel, then they will reintroduce a surplusage problem
into § 2B1.1(b)(10). On this view, every case that would fall under the relocation enhancement would necessarily fall under the
sophisticated-means enhancement as well. Since both enhancements carry the same increase in offense levels,217 this reading
would leave the relocation enhancement with no legal effect.
Furthermore, reading the sophisticated-means enhancement
too broadly could render the enhancement itself meaningless. Baer
has already voiced concerns about the overuse of the sophisticatedmeans enhancement. She notes that actions which “appeared
particularly complicated back in 1998 [when § 2B1.1(b)(10) was
issued]” could be carried out by “amateurs” today.218 But she also
observes that the use of the sophisticated-means enhancement
has grown precipitously in recent years,219 perhaps because courts
continue to rely on outdated notions of what constitutes an “especially complex or [ ] intricate” means of committing fraud.220 The
similar overuse of the “more than minimal planning” enhancement—the predecessor to the sophisticated-means enhancement—led the Commission to repeal the enhancement since it “no
longer divided the ‘really sophisticated schemers from the mass of
ordinary thieves.’”221 If current trends continue, the sophisticatedmeans enhancement could meet the same fate.
Thus, a narrow range of multijurisdictional schemes should
receive neither the relocation enhancement nor the sophisticatedmeans enhancement. The Third Circuit case of United States v.
Braxton222 provides an example of this type of scheme. In Braxton,
the defendant made fraudulent purchases at Home Depot stores
in six different states.223 She accomplished this by buying a $30
prepaid card and destroying its magnetic strip, allowing her to
217

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(10) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Baer, supra note 62, at 66.
219 Id. at 69 & tbl.1.
220 Id. at 66–67 (quoting U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9 (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 2018)).
221 Id. at 64 (quoting Frank O. Bowman III, Coping with “Loss”: A Re-Examination
of Sentencing Federal Economic Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461,
499 (1998)).
222 374 F. App’x 248 (3d Cir. 2010).
223 Id. at 248–49.
218
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make purchases beyond the card limit. 224 The Third Circuit
found that the relocation enhancement applied to the defendant’s sentence, but it relied on a general-intent reading to reach
this result225—something that my reading would not allow. The
sophisticated-means would also not apply to this case on my view.
Though the scheme involves multijurisdictional travel, there is
nothing especially elaborate about altering a single prepaid card
and presenting it for fraudulent purchases. Accordingly, courts
should avoid imposing enhanced sentences on defendants like
Braxton, regardless of which provision of § 2B1.1(b)(10) they
choose to invoke.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, courts should change their approach to interpreting § 2B1.1(b)(10) in three ways. First, courts should reject
the nature-of-scheme approach advanced by the Third and Sixth
Circuits. This approach, which holds that the relocation enhancement applies “‘where travel to other jurisdictions’ to avoid detection by law enforcement is ‘a key component of a fraud scheme,’”226
requires courts to give the relocation enhancement a generalintent reading. This result would contravene the text, structure,
and history of the relocation enhancement.
Second, courts should formulate a clear legal rule regarding
where a fraudulent scheme is located for purposes of
§ 2B1.1(b)(10). My proposed rule—a fraudulent scheme is located
wherever a member of that scheme deliberately deceives another
for personal gain—would provide some much-needed clarity and
consistency in this area of federal sentencing. On this view, courts
would only apply the relocation enhancement when a defendant
deliberately deceived a victim in one jurisdiction, grew to suspect
an investigation into her scheme, moved to a new jurisdiction in
light of that suspected investigation, and committed an act of deception again in the new jurisdiction.
Finally, courts should use the sophisticated-means enhancement to address the dangers posed by multijurisdictional
schemes. The sophisticated-means enhancement provides a more
tractable legal standard for courts to apply, and it will generally
224

Id.
Id. at 249–50.
226 Woodson, 960 F.3d at 855 (quoting United States v. Thornton, 718 F. App’x 399,
403–04 (6th Cir. 2018)).
225
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produce a greater deterrent effect on crime going forward. But
courts should temper this enthusiasm with a keen eye for what
really counts as “especially complex” conduct in the modern day.
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APPENDIX: U.S. SENTENCING TABLE
SENTENCING TABLE
(in months of imprisonment)
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)

Zone A

Zone B
Zone C

Zone D

Offense
Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

(0 or 1)

(2 or 3)

(4, 5, 6)

(7, 8, 9)

(10, 11, 12)

(13 or more)

0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
4–10
6–12
8–14
10–16
12–18
15–21
18–24
21–27
24–30
27–33
30–37
33–41
37–46
41–51
46–57
51–63
57–71
63–78
70–87
78–97
87–108
97–121
108–135
121–151
135–168
151–188
168–210
188–235
210–262
235–293
262–327
292–365
324–405
360–life
life

0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
1–7
2–8
4–10
6–12
8–14
10–16
12–18
15–21
18–24
21–27
24–30
27–33
30–37
33–41
37–46
41–51
46–57
51–63
57–71
63–78
70–87
78–97
87–108
97–121
108–135
121–151
135–168
151–188
168–210
188–235
210–262
235–293
262–327
292–365
324–405
360–life
360–life
life

0–6
0–6
0–6
0–6
1–7
2–8
4–10
6–12
8–14
10–16
12–18
15–21
18–24
21–27
24–30
27–33
30–37
33–41
37–46
41–51
46–57
51–63
57–71
63–78
70–87
78–97
87–108
97–121
108–135
121–151
135–168
151–188
168–210
188–235
210–262
235–293
262–327
292–365
324–405
360–life
360–life
360–life
life

0–6
0–6
0–6
2–8
4–10
6–12
8–14
10–16
12–18
15–21
18–24
21–27
24–30
27–33
30–37
33–41
37–46
41–51
46–57
51–63
57–71
63–78
70–87
77–96
84–105
92–115
100–125
110–137
121–151
135–168
151–188
168–210
188–235
210–262
235–293
262–327
292–365
324–405
360–life
360–life
360–life
360–life
life

0–6
0–6
2–8
4–10
6–12
9–15
12–18
15–21
18–24
21–27
24–30
27–33
30–37
33–41
37–46
41–51
46–57
51–63
57–71
63–78
70–87
77–96
84–105
92–115
100–125
110–137
120–150
130–162
140–175
151–188
168–210
188–235
210–262
235–293
262–327
292–365
324–405
360–life
360–life
360–life
360–life
360–life
life

0–6
1–7
3–9
6–12
9–15
12–18
15–21
18–24
21–27
24–30
27–33
30–37
33–41
37–46
41–51
46–57
51–63
57–71
63–78
70–87
77–96
84–105
92–115
100–125
110–137
120–150
130–162
140–175
151–188
168–210
188–235
210–262
235–293
262–327
292–365
324–405
360–life
360–life
360–life
360–life
360–life
360–life
life

